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MAKING THE WATERS A LITTLE MURKIER: BROADENING
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT THE EXPENSE OF THE
CLEAN WATER ACT
Defenders of Wildlife v. United States Environmental Protection Agency'
I. INTRODUCTION
In Defenders, the Ninth Circuit adopted an overly broad reading of
section 7 of the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") and expanded its effects
on the Environmental Protection Agency's ("EPA") statutorily mandated
duty to transfer control of pollution permitting programs to the various
states. This broad reading not only creates an unnecessary conflict
between the ESA and the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), it fails to follow the
basic legal principle of stare decisis and ignores the clear intent of
Congress in enacting the pollution permitting programs and the CWA.
Despite the apparent attempt to protect endangered species, the court in
actuality provides no greater protection and creates an unnecessary
statutory conflict.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The CWA of 19722 established the National Pollution Discharge
Elimination ("pollution permitting") System.3 This law gave the EPA the
authority to issue permits allowing for the discharge of pollutants into
navigable waters.4 A state may apply to the EPA to administer the
pollution permitting program for waters within the state's borders. The
EPA is required to grant the transfer if it finds that the state satisfies nine
criteria outlined in the statute.6
' 420 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter "Defenders"].
2 Codified as 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1972).
3 Defenders, 420 F.3d at 950. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)).
'Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)).
6 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1974).
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Shortly after the enactment of the CWA, Congress passed the
ESA.7 Section 7 of the ESA places requirements on all federal agencies
regarding any "action authorized, funded or carried out by such agency."8
Section 7 of the ESA requires agencies to consult with the Fish and
Wildlife Service and other agencies to insure that their actions are not
likely to jeopardize a protected species.9 Defenders involves Arizona's
application to the EPA for a transfer of the pollution permitting program
and the EPA's subsequent approval of that program in light of the
requirements outlined in the CWA and ESA.
On January 14, 2002, the state of Arizona applied to the EPA for
transfer of pollution permitting authority for the waterways of Arizona.' 0
The application stated that the Arizona Department of Environmental
Quality ("ADEQ") would be responsible for administering the program."
Upon review of Arizona's application, the San Francisco EPA office
determined that the transfer could affect species on the Endangered
Species List and accordingly initiated a formal consultation with the
FWS.12 The EPA noted that the language of section 7(a)(2) of the ESA,
"to insure that any action authorized, funded or carried out [by the EPA] is
unlikely to jeopardize listed species or adversely modify their critical
habitat," required the EPA to enter into consultation with the FWS."
During the consultation, FWS field office staff conveyed reservations
about the transfer because they feared Arizona would issue permits
without requiring applicants to take mitigating measures required by
previous section 7 consultations.' 4 The FWS staff also stated that the loss
of protections provided for under section 7 consultations must be
considered in the Biological Opinion regarding the transfer.'5 In response
7 Codified as 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2000).
16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
9 See Defenders, 420 F.3d at 951.
o Id
" Id. at 952.
"Id.
14 Id. Other pollution permits in Arizona had been the subject of previous section 7
consultations. As a result of these consultations, steps were taken to mitigate the effects
of pollution on the protected species' critical habitat. Id.
15 id.
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to the concerns of FWS staff, EPA staff stated that they believed the EPA
could not base a transfer of the pollution permitting program on FWS
concerns because the agency did not have the authority to regulate impacts
unrelated to water quality.
The FWS and EPA then developed an Interagency Elevation
Document which transferred authority over the Biological Opinion to the
directors of the National Marine Fisheries Service, FWS and the EPA's
Deputy Assistant Administrator of Water.' 7 A consultation occurred at the
national level between the EPA, FWS and the Field Supervisor of FWS's
Arizona Ecologic Services field office.18 Subsequently, FWS released a
Biological Opinion that noted the loss of section 7 consultation and
recommended the approval of transfer to Arizona.' 9 Two days after the
issuance of the Biological Opinion, the EPA approved the transfer and
indicated that the Biological Opinion "appropriately considered all
relevant information regarding the effects of the approval." 20
The Defenders of Wildlife, the Center for Biological Diversity and
a resident of Pima County, Arizona (collectively, "Defenders") filed two
separate lawsuits challenging the transfer of the pollution permitting
program.21 The first suit was a petition for review of the EPA's decision
granting the transfer.22 In their petition, Defenders alleged the EPA's
transfer decision did not adequately take into account the effect of transfer
on the endangered species and their habitats in Arizona. 23 Defenders also
alleged the EPA violated the ESA by relying on the Biological Opinion
and that it was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA").24 Defenders' second action was an ESA and APA
6 Id. at 953.
1Id. A Biological Opinion is an opinion that FWS is required to issue during the section
7 consultation which analyzes to what extent an action is likely to harm a listed species or
its habitat. 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (2005).
" Defenders, 420 F.3d at 953.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 954.
21 Id. The court held that Defenders' members met the three part standing test under
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); the court accordingly recognized Defenders
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suit alleging inter alia that the FWS Biological Opinion violated the
standards established by the ESA.2 5 The two actions were combined by the
Ninth Circuit in this case.26
In Defenders, the Ninth Circuit held that the EPA erred in deciding
it lacked authority to consider the effects of transfer on listed species.27
The court also held that the Biological Opinion the EPA relied on was
legally flawed and it was error for the EPA to rely on it.28 The case was
remanded to the EPA for further proceedings consistent with the court's
judgment.2 9
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The interplay between the CWA and the ESA is at the heart of the
decision in Defenders.30 Since its enactment, the CWA has undergone
several changes. 3' In Defenders, the court focuses on 33 U.S.C. § 1342.32
Section 1342(b) allows the governor of a state to apply to the EPA for
control of the permitting program that regulates the discharge of pollutants
into the waters within the state's borders. 33 As previously noted, section
1342(b) states that the EPA Administrator "shall approve" applications by
the state provided that the state's pro ram satisfies the nine standards
contained in sections 1342(b)(1)-(b)(9). The nine requirements outlined
25 d
26 Id. at 954-55.
27 Id. at 977.
28 Id. at 971-72.
29 Id. at 979.
30 See id. at 950.
31 The first amendment occurred in 1977, and then subsequently in 1987, 1992, 1995, and
2000. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387.
12 Defenders, 420 F.3d at 950.
3 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b). The statute refers to water as the "navigable waters" within a
state. Id. There is currently legislation pending in Congress to change this language to
"waters of the United States." H.R. 1356, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
34 The nine standards that a state's program must satisfy are as follows:
(1) To issue permits which (A) apply, and insure compliance with, any
applicable requirements of sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317 and 1343
of this title; (B) are for fixed terms not exceeding five years; [that] (C)
can be terminated or modified for cause including, but not limited to,
the following: (i) violation of any condition of the permit; (ii) obtaining
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a permit by misrepresentation, or failure to disclose fully all relevant
facts; (iii) change in any condition that requires either a temporary or
permanent reduction or elimination of the permitted discharge; (D)
control the disposal of pollutants into wells; (2) (A) To issue permits
which apply, and insure compliance with all applicable requirements of
section 1318 of this title; or (B) [t]o inspect, monitor, enter, and require
reports to at least the same extent as required in section 1318 of this
title; (3) To insure that the public, and any other State the waters of
which may be affected, receive notice of each application for a permit
and to provide an opportunity for public hearing before a ruling on each
such application; (4) To insure that the Administrator receives notice of
each application (including a copy thereof) for a permit; (5) To insure
that any State (other than the permitting State), whose waters may be
affected by the issuance of a permit may submit written
recommendations to the permitting State (and the Administrator) with
respect to any permit application and, if any part of such written
recommendations are not accepted by the permitting State that the
permitting State will notify such affected State (and the Administrator)
in writing of its failure to so accept such recommendations together
with its reason for so doing; (6) To insure that no permit will be issued
if, in the judgment of the Secretary of the Army acting through the
Chief of Engineers, after consultation with the Secretary of the
department in which the Coast Guard is operating, anchorage and
navigation of any of the navigable waters would be substantially
impaired thereby; (7) To abate violations of the permit or the permit
program, including civil and criminal penalties and other ways and
means of enforcement; (8) To insure that any permit for a discharge
from a publicly owned treatment works includes conditions to require
the identification in terms of character and volume of pollutants of any
significant source introducing pollutants subject to pretreatment
standards under section 1317(b) of this title into such works and a
program to assure compliance with such pretreatment standards by each
such source, in addition to adequate notice to the permitting agency of
(A) new introductions into such works of pollutants from any source
which would be a new source as defined in section 1316 of this title if
such source were discharging pollutants, (B) new introductions of
pollutants into such works from a source which would be subject to
section 1311 of this title if it were discharging such pollutants, or (C) a
substantial change in volume or character of pollutants being
introduced into such works by a source introducing pollutants into such
works at the time of issuance of the permit. Such notice shall include
information on the quality and quantity of effluent to be introduced into
such treatment works and any anticipated impact of such change in the
195
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in section 1342(b) make reference to several other sections within the
CWA. Many of these sections contain provisions which require the
programs to guard against harm to wildlife and/or habitats.36
Section 1342 of the CWA requires any state permitting program
issued under section 1342 to be in compliance with the requirements of
section 1342 and 1314(i)(2)3 ' at all times.3 8 This section of 1342 allows
the EPA Administrator to withdraw prior approval of a state's permitting
program if it is determined that the program is not operated in accordance
with all provisions of section 1342.39
In Defenders, the court examined section 7 of the ESA.40 Section 7
requires every federal agency to have a formal consultation with FWS to
insure that its actions are not likely to further endanger a listed species.41
This consultation should result in the creation of a biological assessment
containing information about species that may be present in the area
affected by an agency's actions. 42 The biological assessment should
quantity or quality of effluent to be discharged from such publicly
owned treatment works; and (9) To insure that any industrial user of
any publicly owned treatment works will comply with sections
1284(b), 1317, and 1318 of this title.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
36 See 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(h)(2) (requiring the "discharge of pollutants" not to interfere
with the protection and maintenance of native marine life or wildlife); 33 U.S.C. §
1312(a) (requiring the establishment of "effluent limitations" or "alternative effluent
control strategies" for "point source" polluters that discharges pollutants that would
interfere with the protection of marine life and wildlife); and 33 U.S.C. § 1343 (requiring
the Administrator to "promulgate guidelines for determining the degradation of the
waters" which shall include the effect of discharging pollutants on human, marine life
and wildlife).
3 Section 1314(i)(2) deals with the guidelines for monitoring, enforcing, reporting,
funding and personnel qualifications that the state programs must satisfy.
3 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(2).
3 1 d. § 1342(c)(3).
40 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (The designations "Section 7" and "Section 1536" occur
interchangeably in both the instant decision and this note. This is required to point out
specific language contained in the statute and allows for the provisions of the Act
contained in section 7 to be discussed as a unit.).
41 See id. This consultation takes place with the Secretary or their designee, the
Department of Fisheries and Wildlife. Id.
421 Id. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
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further indicate the likely effect the action will have on the species.43
Similar to the CWA, the ESA has been through several changes since its
original enactment.44 Unlike the provisions of the CWA at issue in this
case, section 7 of the ESA generally does not cross reference other
sections of the Act, but instead contains all applicable requirements in one
subsection.45
While the interplay between the ESA and other statutory
provisions such as the CWA received little examination by the Ninth
Circuit prior to Defenders, other circuits have examined the issue since the
1970's. One of the first cases examining this issue is Conservation Law
Foundation of New England, Inc. v. Andrus.46 In Conservation Law, the
Conservation Law Foundation sought a preliminary injunction against the
Secretary of the Interior to cease the leasing of tracts for oil and gas
exploration.4 7 The First Circuit declared that the contracts entered into by
the Secretary would require future action on his part and, as such,
48
contained an implied condition that his actions did not violate the ESA.
The court noted that by its terms, the ESA applied to all of the Secretary's
actions. 49 Conservation Law is also instructive when considering how the
ESA applies when a federal actor is operating under powers conveyed by
another statute.50 In Conservation Law both the district court and the First
Circuit rejected the appellants' argument that the leases caused
4 31 d. § 1536(c)(1).
" 16 U.S.C. § 1536. Section 7 of the ESA was amended in 1978, 1979, 1982, 1986, and
1988. Id. There is currently legislation in Congress to amend Section 7. This
amendment would alter much of the language in section 1536(a)(2) and would add the
wording that, "[a]ny Federal agency or the Secretary, in conducting any analysis pursuant
to paragraph (2), shall consider only the effects of any agency action that are distinct
from a baseline of all effects upon the relevant species that have occurred or are
occurring prior to the action." H.R. 3824, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
45 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536. Section 1536(a) does make reference to section 1533, which is
the section of the ESA that governs the selection of a species endangered or threatened.
See id. § 1533.
4 623 F.2d 712 (1st Cir. 1979).
47 Id. at 714. The leases were made pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act,
43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-56 (2000). Id. at 714-15.
48 Id. at 715.
49 id
s See id. at 714.
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"irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources," which was
prohibited by the ESA.5 ' The appellants' argument was based on the idea
that the leases could only be cancelled in accordance with the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act ("OCSLA") and the standards of OCSLA
were not as rigorous as those contained in the ESA.52 The reasoning
applied by the district court, and affirmed by the First Circuit, stated that
any difference that may have existed between the two statutes was taken
care of by stipulations that conditioned an applicant's rights under the
lease and granted the Secretary authority to regulate post-sale.5 3 A similar
issue arose in Defenders, where the allegation is that the loss of section 7
protections is an indirect effect. In Defenders, statutory provisions outside
of section 7 would require Arizona to meet certain standards. 54 These
provisions also give the EPA Administrator the ability to intercede post-
transfer.5 5
A Fifth Circuit case, Save the Bay, Inc. v. Administrator of the
Environmental Protection Agency, deals more directly with the permitting
programs.56 The issues in Save the Bay revolved around a decision by the
Mississippi Air and Water Pollution Control Commission to issue a permit
to DuPont for a titanium dioxide plant. The EPA acquiesced to the
Commission's decision to issue the permit, and the suit alleged that the
EPA should have revoked the Commission's authority to grant such
permits. 57 The court concluded that judicial review of the EPA's discretion
fell into two narrow categories.' 8 The first category is applicable when the
proposed permit contains "a violation of the applicable federal guidelines
that the agency failed to consider." 59 The second category is implicated in
52 Id. at 714-15.
Id. at 715.
54 Defenders, 420 F.3d 946, 950 (9th Cir. 2005); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (2000).
s See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
56 556 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1977).
s7 Id. at 1284. While the case does not expressly examine the relationship between the
CWA and the ESA, the court examines the CWA and its provisions regarding the
permitting programs and notes that Save the Bay is an environmental protection group
basing its claims on alleged defects in the permitting process which will negatively affect
the bay. See id. at 1287-90.
58 Id. at 1295-96.
59 d
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cases where the agency has considered improper factors and thus "tainted
the agency's exercise of discretion." 60 Save the Bay bears on the Ninth
Circuit's examination of the issues in Defenders because the Ninth Circuit
previously adopted the two category standard announced by the Fifth
Circuit.6 1 The Ninth Circuit has not rescinded its adoption of this standard
and the court made no mention of an intention to overrule its prior
decision on this issue.
The Ninth Circuit does have a line of cases which state that the
EPA Administrator must transfer permitting programs to a state if the state
has met the requirements of Section 1342(b).62 The leading case in this
chain of case law, Shell Oil Co. v. Train, also recognized Congress's
intent to "recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and
rights of States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution." 64 The court in
Shell Oil went on to hold that Congress's clear intent was for the states to
assume the majority of the operation of the National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES") programs.6 5
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant decision, the court examined whether the EPA's
transfer decision violated the requirements of the ESA and whether the
decision was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA.66 The court
emphasized that each agency "has an obligation to 'insure' that any action
it takes is 'not likely to jeopardize' listed species or their critical
habitats,"67 and thus had to examine the "consistency of the EPA's
6 Id. at 1296.
61 See Methow Valley Citizens Council v. Reg'1 Forester, 833 F.2d 810, 814 (9th Cir.
1987), overruled by Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989)
(overruled in part on different grounds).
62 See Boise Cascade Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 942 F.2d 1427, 1430 (9th Cir. 1991); Aminoil
U.S.A., Inc., v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd., 674 F.2d 1227, 1229 (9th Cir. 1982);
Shell Oil v. Train, 585 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1978).
6' 585 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1978).
64Id. at 410.65id.
66 See Defenders, 420 F.3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 2005).
67 d. (citing 16 U.S.C. 1536(a)(2) (2000)). The court then outlined the test for arbitrary
and capricious review stating that an agency decision will survive review if the decision
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reasoning," the legal conclusions reached in the Biological Opinion, and
other information the EPA relied on in making its decision.68
First, the court found the EPA's analysis to be unreasonable,
primarily because it relied on contradictory views of the same statutory
language. 69 The court held that the propositions which formed the bases of
the EPA's actions cannot both be accurate statements of the agencies'
obligations.7o Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA does not make a distinction
between "the trigger" for the requirements that would compel an agency's
consultation and those that compel agencies to make sure their actions do
not jeopardize species.7 1 The court held that the EPA's transfer decision
was error and remanded to the agency for a "plausible explanation of its
decision, based on a single, coherent interpretation of the statute." 72
Next, the court examined whether the loss of section 7 consultation
should have been included in the FWS's Biological Opinion as an indirect
effect of the transfer.7 3 As a starting point for this analysis the court
indicated, "a negative impact on listed species is the likely direct or
indirect effect of the agency's action only if the agency has some control
over the result." 74 If this control aspect is absent from the equation, the
requisite nexus is not present. The court then adopted a test created by
the United States Supreme Court in Department of Transportation v.
is rational, founded in relevant factors and if it is within the scope of an agency's
statutory authority. Id. at 959.68 d
6 9 d. at 961. The statutory language the court is referring to is the language of section 7
of the ESA.7 0 Id. The bases underlying the EPA's actions were that "(1) it must, under the
Endangered Species Act, consult concerning transfers of CWA permitting authority, but
(2) it is not permitted, as a matter of law, to take into account the impact on listed species
in making the transfer decision." Id.
1 Id.
72 Id. at 962.
7 1 Id. at 962-63.
74 Id. at 962 (using the control test utilized in Department of Transportation v. Public
Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004)).
7 See id.
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Public Citizen76 to determine the likely effects of agency action under the
ESA.77
Public Citizen involved application of the National Environmental
Policy Act to a Department of Transportation regulation regarding
Mexican trucks traveling on American roads under the North American
Free Trade Agreement. The Court in Public Citizen held "that where an
agency has no ability to prevent a certain effect due to its limited statutory
authority over the relevant actions, the agency cannot be considered a
legally relevant 'cause' of the effect."79 The Ninth Circuit found that the
statute implicated in Public Citizen was sufficiently analogous to the
provisions of the ESA under examination in the instant decision and
applied the holding in Public Citizen to this case.8 0
The court in Defenders focused on the language of section 7(a)(2 ,
which required an agency to insure against jeopardizing listed species.82
The court determined the definition of "insure" was "to make certain."
The court held the language of section 7(a)(2) was unambiguous and
conveyed a duty to federal agencies containing no exceptions. 83In
reaching this conclusion the court examined the legislative history of the
ESA and determined that Congress intended for the ESA to create
76 541 U.S. 752 (2004) (The question specifically before the Court was whether NEPA
required the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration to prepare an environmental
impact statement with regard to the pollution Mexican trucks caused while on American
roads.).
n Defenders, 420 F.3d at 963.
7 1 Id. at 962.
79 Id. at 963.
go Id.81id.
82 Id. at 963-64. The court also cites Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153
(1978), to support this interpretation of the statutory language. Id.
8 Id. at 964. Since the language of the statute did not provide for any exceptions that
none exist and that this lack of provision that would allow for agency to escape the
requirements of Section 7 creates a duty on the part of the agency to meet the
requirements of Section 7. See id. at 964-66. The court does note that in 1978 Congress
created a narrow exception in sections 7(g) and (h) by creating a process through which
agencies could seek exemptions from an Endangered Species Committee. However,
these exceptions do not apply because the EPA did not avail itself of the process. Id at
966.
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obligations on agencies when they were acting affirmatively. 84 The court
also held that Congress, through the ESA, created additional obligations
and authority outside of these obligations bestowed by the agency's
governing statutes.8 5 Additionally, the EPA's actions were considered the
sort that triggered the obligation to consult and insure there are no adverse
effects on listed species or their habitats.8 6 Further, those obliations were
not in conflict with the EPA's obligations under the CWA. The court
found the FWS Biological Opinion was flawed because it ignored effects
that may flow from the transfer decision and therefore, the EPA erred in
relying on the Biological Opinion.8 8
The court noted a split of authority on the issue of whether the
ESA actually confers additional authority to agencies outside the authority
conveyed in the governing statutes. 89 The court briefly analyzed decisions
from the First, Fifth, Eighth and D.C. Circuits and was not persuaded by
the argument that the ESA does not convey additional power and authority90to agencies.
In making the decision, the EPA relied on sources other than the
Biological Opinion.91 The final issue the court examined was whether any
of the other sources the EPA based its transfer decision on could save the
decision.92 The court did not find the EPA's reliance on the Memorandum
of Agreement, Arizona state law, or other legal protections for endangered
species to be suitable replacements for the section 7 consultation benefits
8 See id. at 966-67.
8 See id.86 Id at 967.8 Id. at 968-70.
88 Id. at 971.89 Id at 970.
90 Id. (specifically pointing to perceived deficiencies in the D.C. Circuit's interpretation
of section 7 in Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maint. Trust v. FERC, 962
F.2d 27, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1992)).
91 See id. at 978. These sources included the Memorandum of Agreement between the
agencies involved, Arizona state law and other legal protections of endangered species.
Id.
92 See id. at 978-79.
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that would be lost as a result of transfer. 93 The court held that the petition
for review should be granted and remanded to the EPA. 94
In the dissent, Chief Judge Thompson discussed two general
points: (1) the presence of precedent that the ESA does not apply to
situations where an agency has no discretion over their actions; and (2) the
fact that the overly expansive majority interpretation of the statutory
language and circuit precedent does not support such an expansive
interpretation.9 5 Judge Thompson stated that the EPA was statutorily
required to evaluate Arizona's application against nine exclusive
specifications.9 6 The statute mandates that if the Administrator of the EPA
finds that the state has met the statutory requirements, he must approve the
application. Therefore, the EPA did not have discretion to deny Arizona's
application for transfer of the pollution permitting program.9 7 Judge
Thompson concluded that the petition for review should be denied since
the EPA's authority over the administration of the pollution permitting
program was non-discretionary.9 8
V. COMMENT
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Defenders unduly expanded the
effect of the ESA obligations Congress placed on federal agencies. In
doing so, the Ninth Circuit failed to fully consider the precedent of the
Ninth Circuit and that of its sister circuits. The Ninth Circuit's analysis
creates an unnecessary conflict between the language of two statutes.
The case law and the intent of Congress regarding the pollution
permitting programs of the National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System are clear. The EPA's transfer of the pollution permitting program
was not a discretionary function. Prior to making the transfer, the EPA
entered into consultation with the FWS as required by section 7 of the
ESA. By holding that the EPA's actions were erroneous, the Ninth Circuit
effectively struck obligatory language from the CWA and supplanted it
" See id. at 978.
94 Id. at 979.
9 Id. (Thompson, J., dissenting).
96 Id. at 980.
97 id.
9 1 Id. at 981.
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with an overly broad interpretation of the ESA. This decision not only
infringes on a statutory "right" conveyed by Congress to the states, it fails
to provide any additional protection to the endangered species caught in
the middle of this controversy.
When the EPA entered into consultation it was following the
requirements set forth in section 7 of the ESA. In examining the
legitimacy of the EPA's actions, the court engages in an analysis to
determine if the EPA's reasoning in seeking section 7 consultations and its
subsequent transfer decision were coherent. 99 During this analysis the
court states that the line of reasoning in the Biological Opinion, which the
EPA followed, was faulty. 00 The court found the EPA's determination
that it must enter section 7 consultation and the assertion that the EPA
cannot consider the effects of transfer on endangered species to be
mutually exclusive.' 0' While there is some truth in this holding, because
both of these contentions are born of statutes applicable to the EPA, the
aforementioned determinations cannot be considered improper factors that
would "taint" the decision.102 The court also ignored some of the most
crucial language in the Biological Opinion. The Biological Opinion notes
that the transfer does not create a substantive change in the permit
program. 0 3 The Biological Opinion also mentions that other federal and
state laws would protect any endangered species in the area.104
These facts bear directly on the conclusion reached by the
Biological Opinion that the transfer of the permitting program would not
have an indirect effect. 05 While the reported opinion does not go into
detail on which laws the Biological Opinion refers to, the court notes that
section 9 of the ESA'0 6 was included on the list. The court makes note that
FWS staff had mentioned section 9 of the ESA does not generally apply to
Id. at 959-62 (majority opinion).
'oo Id. at 961.
101 See id.
102 See Save the Bay, Inc. v. EPA, 556 F.2d 1282, 1296 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Methow
Valley Citizens Council v. Reg'l Forester, 833 F.2d 810, 814 (9th Cir. 1987).
103 Defenders, 420 F.3d at 953-54.
' Id. at 954.
10s Id. at 953-54.
106 16 U.S.C § 1538 (2000).
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endangered species of plants.' 07 While the accuracy of this assertion is not
addressed directly, the opinion does nothing to dispel it and the court
included the information in the section of the opinion that finds the EPA's
opinion and the Biological Opinion faulty. Even a cursory look at both
section 9 of the ESA and Arizona law show that there are indeed
significant protections built into the system such that section 7 protections
are almost superfluous.108 As previously noted there is also support from
other circuits holding that when a discrepancy in standards is nullified by
other factors it is not grounds for reversal of the agency action in
question.109
Section 1538 of Title 16, section 9 of the ESA, is divided into
seven primary subsections."10 Subsection (a? expressly states what a
person cannot do to an endangered species. While section (a)(1) does
not deal with endangered plant life, section (a)(2) expressly deals with
endangered species of plants and identifies unlawful treatment of such
plants." 2 While this fact on its own may not be indicative that endangered
species are receiving additional protections, this statute, in conjunction
with other federal law and the law of Arizona, create multiple layers of
protection for the species.
In order to consider the transfer of the program regulating permits
for pollution to the state of Arizona, Arizona must satisfy nine
requirements outlined in 33 U.S.C. § 1342.1 13 The first of these provisions
is to insure compliance with "any applicable requirements of sections
1311, 1312, 1316, 1317 and 1343."ll4 To truly appreciate the requirements
of this provision, an examination of the sections listed in the statute is
necessary. Section 1343 likely carries the most weight in determining the
107 Defenders, 420 F.3d at 953-54.
108 The court does briefly mention one Arizona law mentioned in the Biological Opinion,
ARiz. REv. STAT. § 3-904, and concludes that its prohibition on the taking of native
plants is not a sufficient substitute for section 7 even though the Biological Opinion notes
that this includes endangered and threatened species of plants. Defenders, 420 F.3d, at
975-76.
'0 See Conservation Law Found., 623 F.2d 712, 715(5th Cir. 1979).
110 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538.
SId.
112id
113 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
114Id. § 1342(b)(1)(A).
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level of protection the state is required to afford the protected species.
Section 1343 requires all permits to be issued in compliance with the
guidelines set out in Section 1343(c).'" 5 Section 1343(c) not only provides
that the EPA Administrator is the party that promulgates the guidelines, it
also requires the EPA Administrator to include the effects of disposal
pollutants on the "wildlife, plankton, fish, shellfish, shorelines and
beaches" when promulgating these guidelines." 6 This subsection also
provides the EPA Administrator leeway to consider the effects of disposal
pollutants on other things in the area as the list provided in the statute is
not exhaustive.'" 7 This section is significant in two ways. First, it shows
the level of protection a state is required to maintain and identifies that the
EPA Administrator is responsible for setting the guidelines for
implementing the protection. Second, the statute does not make any
mention of a duty of the EPA Administrator to consult with other federal
or state agencies.
Like section 1343, section 1316 imposes a duty on states to insure
that their programs require the same degree of application and
enforcement regarding standards of performance as the Administrator
requires.'
The laws of Arizona insure protection, as many of Arizona's
statutes either reference, incorporate, or insure compliance with provisions
of the ESA.ll 9 The court's failure to analyze the layers of protection is
115 33 U.S.C. § 1343(a).116 Id. § 1343(c)(1)(A).
"
7 id.
... See 33 U.S.C. § 1316(c). Section 1316(a) defines standards of performance as
standards "for the control of the discharge of pollutants which reflects the greatest degree
of effluent reduction which the Administrator determines to be achievable through
application of the best available demonstrated control technology, processes, operating
methods, or other alternatives, including, where practicable, [and] a standard permitting
no discharge of pollutants." Id. § 1316(a).
"
9 See ARiz. REv. STAT. § 3-903(B) (requiring that species listed category 1 species or
those listed as endangered or threatened under the ESA must be included on Arizona's
highly safeguarded list.); ARiz. REv. STAT. § 17-236(B) (requiring that the issuance of
licenses for transporting sport raptors be consistent with the requirements of the ESA);
and ARIz. REV. STAT. § 49-255.01(K) (requiring that any conditions on permits
concerning endangered species be limited to those required by the ESA.) (This statute is
the Arizona Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Program at issue in Defenders).
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central in this case because it makes the limited amount of changes that
occur, mainly procedural changes. As the Biological Opinion points out,
this reduces the number of mechanisms available to agencies in their
efforts to protect endangered species. It does not result in a substantive
change in the amount of protection afforded to protected species. 120 The
importance of this distinction becomes clear when it is combined with an
examination of the operative language in Section 7.
Section 402.02 of the Code of Federal Regulations defines what
"indirect effect" means for the purposes of Section 7 of the ESA.121
Section 402.02 provides that an indirect effect is "an effect of the agency
action that occurs later in time but is reasonably certain to occur." 122 This
language precludes the consideration of effects that are the result of
conjecture. Since there has been no change in the substantive protections
afforded to the species, and the transfer of the program only removed one
of the available enforcement mechanisms, any effect that may occur is
conjecture. Those effects are not indirect and thus not binding on the
decision making process of either the EPA or the FWS. As such, the court
incorrectly categorized the FWS's Biological Opinion as flawed and the
EPA was justified in relying on the Biological Opinion in making the
transfer decision.
As previously noted, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Defenders
created a statutory conflict where one does not actually exist. Section
1342(b) mandates that the EPA Administrator transfer control of the
pollution permitting system to a state upon request after a determination
that the state has met all of the requirements of section 1342(b). Section 7
of the ESA requires a federal agency to consult with the FWS regarding
any negative effects their actions might have on endangered species. Once
the FWS issues a Biological Opinion stating that the agency action is not
the source of a negative effect on endangered species, any perceived
conflict between the statutes evaporates. Here, once the EPA received the
FWS's Biological Opinion, the mandatory language of Section 1342(b)
required the EPA Administrator to turn control of the pollution permitting
program over to the state of Arizona.
120 Defenders, 420 F.3d 946, 953 (9th Cir. 2005).
121 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2005).
122 id
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The Ninth Circuit also failed to follow its own precedent and the
precedent of other circuits on similar matters. While the court properly
adopted the position that an agency cannot escape the section 7
requirements when it is required to act under a complimentary statute, the
court failed to give proper weight to the fact that the EPA in this case is
mandated by Congress to examine the state permitting programs under the
nine exclusive criteria. 2 3 As previously noted, the Ninth Circuit has
previously recognized that the EPA Administrator must approve the
transfer of a pollution permitting program to a state unless the
Administrator can determine that the state's program does not meet the
requirements of section 1342(b).124 As the Ninth Circuit's case law notes,
Congress's intent in this area is clear.125 In creating the NPDES programs
Congress wanted its intent to be unmistakable and to that end Congress
included its intent in unambiguous tenns in section 1251(b). Section
1251(b) states that Congress intends for the states to control the NPDES
programs.126
VI. CONCLUSION
By holding that the EPA Administrator's decision to transfer the
pollution permitting program for Arizona was erroneous, the Ninth Circuit
overrules prior circuit precedent and expands the reach and effect of
section 7 of the ESA by leaps and bounds. This decision also flies in the
face of clear Congressional intent and essentially deletes the mandatory
transfer requirement of section 1342(b) by holding that the loss of section
7 protections is an indirect effect of transfer.
ERIK G. HOLLAND
123 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b); see also Defenders, 420 F.3d at 980 (Thompson, J., dissenting).
12 4 See Boise Cascade Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 942 F.2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1991); Aminoil
U.S.A., Inc. v. Cal. State Water Res. Control Bd,, 674 F.2d 1227, 1229 (9th 1982); Shell
Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d 408,410 (9th Cir. 1978).
125 Shell Oil, 585 F.2d 408, 410.
126 33 U.S.C. § 125 1(b). "It is the policy of Congress that the States manage the
construction grant program under this chapter and implement the permit programs under
sections 1342 ... of this Act." Id.
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